




It is proposed to consider, in a very brief way, the objection
which is raised to the intr.duction of the doctrine of Novation
into the Common Law. If that objection rests upon any well-
settled principle, it should by ,ll means be sustained; but if, on
the other hand, it has no rational foundation., it should not be per-
mitted to obstruct the operation of so useful a doctrine.
Novation is a term of the Civil Law, and it was employed to
denote the substitution of one contract in the place of another. A
transaction of this kind was equally valid whether the original
contract had been already executed as to one of the parties, or
whether. it still remained executory as to both. It is only in the
latter event that the new is substituted for the old contract at the
-Common Law. The maxim of the Common Law is, that an accord
without satisfaction is no bar to a suit upon the original obligation :
and it is accordingly laid down, that an agreement to accept any-
thing other than the original debt is not binding unless founded
upon some new consideration. This,/ it will be observed, is not
simply an application of the well-knoWn principle of law which
requires that each contract shall have a consideration, but it is an
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additional requirement that the consideration on both sides shall
be equal.
If a substituted stood upon the same footing with an original
contract, the debtor's promise to give something else would be
a consideration for the relinquishment of the old debt, and its
relinquishment would in turn be a consideration for the debtor's
_promise. And why may not a creditor relinquish a debt in con-
sideration of the debtor's promise ? Is it because a sum of money
due is thought to be of greater value than the same amount of
money in hand? Such seems to be the drift of the reasoning
against such relinquishment; for it is advanced as an argument,
that a creditor having performed his part of the contract has a
", perfect right" to the debt. (Byles on Bills, Am. edition, 182,
note by the distinguished American editor.) This is true; but it
makes in favor of, instead of against, the validity of the new
contract; it is a reason why the creditor can give the money due,
but by 'no means why he cannot. One has a "c perfect right" to
money in his possession, but that was never heard of as an objec-
tion to his using it. A lawful way to use. money is to give it in
consideration for a contemporaneous promise. The relinquishment
of a debt to which the creditor has a "c perfect right," is equiva-
lent to an advance of an equal amount of money. Why does not
the law treat it, then, as a consideration for a present promise? It
is said, in answer, that the creditor cannot be bound by a naked
agreement to release a debt. But it is a mistake to consider the
agreement naked, and here lies the fallacy of the argument. It
as a consideration; to wit, the promise of the debtor to give
something else. Such a promise is deemed sufficient to sustain
an agreement to pay money outright ; and, if so, it must, of ne-
cessity, be sufficient to sustain a promise to release a debt; for
however "c perfect" may be the " right" to the debt, possession is
still necessary to make the ownership complete.
Thus it appears that substituted and original contracts stand in
reason upon the same footing. How theii is the distinction which
the law makes between them to be accounted foro It probably
arose from the following considerations.
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Should the Courts examine into the consideration of contracts,
they would .be constrained by the principles of equity which guide
their action, to require that the consideration on one side should
be equal to that on the other. In order to enforce such a rule. it
would be necessary to put a specific valuation upon each article
that could become the subject-matter of a contract. But as the
value of goods fluctuates according to the state of the market, this
could not be done. The Courts, therefore, would be obliged
either to pronounce all contracts void for want of equality of con-
sideration, or to assume to be the agent of both parties to re-adjust
the terms of the contracts. It is to avoid either alternative that
they refuse to inquire into the suffiieney of the consideration.
There is one exception to the refusal to inquire into the ade-
quacy of the consideration ; to wit, in contracts for the exchange
-of money. Here the value of the articles to be exchanged is
fixed by law, and the Courts cannot refuse, but are bound to take
judicial notice of the fact. They accordingly hold that, as money
is the legal standard of value, contracts to exchange different
- amounts of money are not binding, because there is no consider-
ation for the balance of, or difference between, the two amounts.
An agreement to give a different amount of money from that
due, or even the same amount upon a differefit time (time being an
additional legal consideration without a return), is not-binding, be-
cause it lacks the equality of consideration which the law requires
in exchanges of money; and without a legal sanction to give the
agreement efficacy, it amounts to nothing; hence it cannot be a
substitute for, or satisfaction of, the debt. As agreements of this
kind make up the bulk of substituted contracts, which are, for
the most part, agreements either for a reduction in the amount
of the debt, or for an extension of credit, it was inferred, though
erroneously, that all substituted contracts are likewise not binding.
It was not observed that where something other than money is
offered in consideration for the money which is due, the tranisac-
tion stands upoii the same footing with other -bargains; in such
case, as in ordinary barter, the debtor agrees to give one thing in
return for another. "And where," said Baron PARKE, in
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Cooper vs. Parker, 15 0. B. 822, "the matter pleaded in satis.
faction of a liquidated demand is of uncertain value, the Court
will not set a value upon it, or injuire into, the sufficiency of the
consideration." In consequence of this oversight in not discrim-
inating between the two classes of contract,-that is, between con-
tracts for the exchange of money, and contracts not for the
exchange of money,-the ambiguous maxim, that an accord without
satisfaction is no bar, was devised in order to prohibit all substi-
tuted contracts. That maxim says, that an agreement is not
satisfaction of a debt; it means, that a void agreement, which is
not an agreement, is not satisfaction of a debt. The question
always is, whether the agreement is binding; that is; whether it
amounts to a legal agreement. It is only when it wants some
essential of a valid agreement, as e. g. a consideration, that it is
said not to be a satisfaction of a debt. Where there is no doubt
about the consideration, as in case of a fresh consideration, the
agreement is invariably held to be satisfaction, if such was the
intention of the parties.
It is easy to see how the maxim, that an accord without satis-
faction is no bar, originated. It is an undue extension of the
familiar rule, that an agreement tordo what the party is already
bound to do is 'not binding. Thus, in trespass for taking the
plaintiff's cattle, it was held not to be a good plea to say, that
there was an accord that the plaintiff should have his cattle again;
that not being satisfaction, unless accompanied by delivery-of the
cattle. 1 Bac. Abr. 22. Accordingly, where the new agree-
nient is merely to do what the party is already bound to do, it is
strictly true that the additional agreement is not satisfaction unless
executed. The new agreement is not binding because it wants a
consideration, and, therefore, having no legal existence, it could
not be satisfaction of the demand.
It is contended that the law must protect the creditor's rights,
which would be impaired if the ffebtor could escape from the terms
of one contract by making another. But the answer to this is,
that the new contract, like any ordindry contract, requires the
consent of both parties; and if the creditor cannot take care of
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his interest in making it, the reason must be that be is incapable
of making any bargain. The argument proves too much; it
would prevent all contracts. Instead of an injury, however, the
new contract works a benefit to the creditor, as well as to the debtor.
Take, for the sake of illustration, the following case :-A con-
tractor, who is unable to raise money, is indebted to a person who
is about to have a house built. Why should not the creditor be
allowed to relinquish his debt, in consideration of his debtor's
agreeing to build him a house of which he stands in need ? In
this way the debtor would be enabled to pay his debt, which other-
wise he could not do, and a creditor to save himself the expendi-
ture of an equal amount of money. Thus it is often the only, as
well as the best mode in which a creditor is able to collect his
debts.
It is evident that the maxim is not now looked upon by the
Courts with favor. Thus Baron PARKE, following Mr. Justice
BYLES in his Treatise on Bills, p. 153, decided in Foster vs.
Dawber, 6 Exch. 839, that the rule does not apply to commer-
cial paper; which he held to be governed by the law meichant,
and to follow, in this respect, the civil law and the continental law
of Europe. By this decision, contracts for the exchange of
money, which mainly take the form of promissory notes and bills
of exchange, and to which alone, as has been shown, the reason
of this rule applies, are withdrawn from its application. This de-
cision looks like the precursor of the total overthrow of the maxim;
for it is inconceivable that the same Court will continue, for any
length of time, to hold an agreement to accept a part of a sum
of money in discharge of the whole to be satisfaction, if put in
the form of a promissory note or bill of exchange, but not if pus
in any other form of a contract, even though it be followed by
actual payment or execution.
This short article, which investigates the ground-work of the doc-
trine of Accord and Satisfaction, is taken from the London Law
Magazine and Law Review for May, 1868 ; a periodical which,
besides abundant professional information, frequently contains
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original suggestions upon recondite points of law which are worthy
the consideration of the student of jurisprudence.
The maxim, which the writer of this article shows to have been
an imperfect generalization, is an illustration, though an un-
fortunate one, of the independent growth of the common law.
Had the civil law been consulted when a case first arose which
called for an examination of the subject, the doctrine of Novation
would have been adopted, as it was in Continental Europe, with-
out hesitation. A strict analysis of the doctrine would have
shown, it is true, that its application should be limited to
such contracts as are not for the exchange of money, in which con-
tracts there exists a perfect bargain,-one thing is agreed to be
given in exchange for another. Money contracts, either original
or substituted, which have but a consideration in part and. none for
the residue, should, in strictness, be pronounced void, but the de-
cision should be distinctly put upon the ground of partial absence
of consideration, which does not apply to any other class of con-
tracts, It is more than probable, however, that the great con-'
venience of leaving to the parties themselves the question of the
sufficiency of the consideration would have determined the Courts
not to exact equality of consideration even in money contracts.
Their subsequent conduct justifies this opinion. The maxim has
been abandoned in all contracts which are put in the form of
negotiable instruments ; in short, to speak generally, in all money
contracts. The English Courts are now in the awkward position
of having subverted the maxim in money contracts, which gave
rise to its invention, and to which it justly applies, and yet of up-
holding it in other classes of contracts to which it was, without
reason, extended.
The reason ordinarily, given for the maxim is delusive. It is
said that the old debt is a past consideration which will not sustain
a promise to do or give anything else in its stead. Now, as our
author says, it is not a consideration for a promise of its own pay-
ment, for that is already due, and an additional promise would not
add to the strength of the obligation. But it is a subsisting con-
sideration to support a contract to do anything else, instead of
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paying the old debt. This is an independent transaction which the
parties enter into after abandoning the old contract, which they
are at liberty to do. Is there any doubt that a promise made by
a third person in consideration for a transfer of the debt would
be binding? and, if so, how can the consideration be said not to
subsist? and may not a creditor contract with his debtor as well as
with a third person ? The law does not incapacitate a man from
transacting business because he has once failed to meet an en-
gagement. If it did, business would come to a dead stop. Now,
if the debt still subsists, what a puerile formality to require it to
be first paid over and then paid back again before the new agree-
ment is held binding! Does this ceremony change the character
of the money thus juggled? or is this circumlocution in harmony
with the common law, which abhors circuity?
There is in this instance, as there is generally, a mode to test
the soundness of the maxim, a species of legal verification. The
method is to ascertain whether the maxim is in unison with other
legal principles. If it conflicts with them, it is an incongruity,
and is necessarily unsound, whereas if it harmonizes with them, it
may justly be deemed verified. Now suppose a creditor agrees
with his debtor to advance, in cash, a sum of money equal to the
debt in return for the debtor's agreement to furnish a specified
quantity of merchandise. What is there to prevent .the creditor
from setting off the debt which he owes by this new contract
against that which is due him by the old ? Absolutely nothing. -
The old debt is extinguished by a set-off of an equal amount of
money; so that it is, in reality, this advance of money which is
the consideration for the new promise by the debtor. A novation
is, therefore, but a set-off, and to deny its validity is to impeach
that of set-off.
An important decision in confirmation of the view here taken,
ts that of Christie vs. Craige, 8 Harris Pa. R. 430. In that case
the creditors agreed, on the day the note became due, to accept, in
full satisfaction of the debt, a quantity of yarn. BLACK, C. J.:
"An accord is generally no bar to an action unless it has been
followed by satisfaction. But where a debt is due by one contract,
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the parties may abolish it and substitute another in its place.
Here the original contract was for the payment of money. The
parties agreed that no money should be paid, but that yarn should
*be furnished instead of money. They had the right to do this;
and having done it, the bargain was for yarn, as much as if money
had never been thought of. If a creditor consents to accept
merchandise in satisfaction for his claim, and the debtor invests
the money with which he would otherwise have paid it in the goods
contracted for, and has those goods ready at the time and place
agreed upon, it would be wrong to say that money might be
claimed afterwards. This principle needs no case to support it;
and common justice will not tolerate that any authority should be
set up against it."
This clear and emphatic language uttered in a case in which the
point was directly.before the Court, should, it would seem, settle
the law upon this point, at least in Pennsylvania. Instead of that,
howeveK, the recent case of Hearn vs. .Kiehl, 2 Wright Pa. R.
147, re-establishes the maxim with a new gloss upon it, which
makes it a still greater restraint upon the freedom of contracting.
The facts of this case are well stated in the syllabus as follows:
" A promise to take as payment of two notes, one over due and
one not yet due, fifty per cent. of the amount of them,. half in
cash and half in a new note at three months, is without considera-
tion, and the agreement is not binding unless executed."
WOODWARD, J. : ", Accord and satisfaction is a good pla by a
debtor to the action of his creditor, but the legal notion of an
accord is a new agreement on a new consideration, to discharge
the debtor, and it is not enough that there be a clear agreement
or accord, and a sufficient consideration, but the accord must be
executed. The plea must allege that the matter was accepted in
satisfaction. * * * Such is the law between debtor- and
creditor.
- The only consideration discernible in the agreement alleged in
the affidavit of defence in this case is time. The sum stipulated to
be paid in satisfaction of the debt was to be paid a little sooner
than the whole debt would fall due, and that was the considera-
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tion for the plaintiff's promise. There -was no other. Granting
the sufficiency of this consideration, there was no execution of
the accord. * * There was, therefore, no satisfaction and so
no defence set forth in the affidavit."
With great deference it is submitted that Mr. Justice WOOD-
WARD stated the law in this case incorrectly. His Honor seems
to have been misled by the inaccuracy of the terms of the maxim.
The meaning of'an accord is not a legal agreement; if it were,
accord would be satisfaction. It is an agreement which lacks some
essential of a legal agreement, and by consequence, wants the
sanction which makes an agreement binding,, and thereby gives it
a legal existence. Whether the. consideration be new or old is
not material, provided it is sufficient. But his Honor's new definition
that " the legal notion of an accord is a new agreement on a new
consideration," and the decision of Hearn vs. .Kie l, in which case
there was the new consideration of time, in accordance with that
definition, makes the maxim still more comprehensive than ever.
Heretofore there has been no question as to an accord being satis-
faction if founded upon a new consideration and accepted as satis-
faction. Chitty on Contracts 659 ; Story on Contracts, § 982 a ;
Parsons on Contracts 194-5-6, and cases cited; Hart vs. Boller,
15 Sergeant & Rawle 162. There is, it is true, an assertion to
be found in 1 Smith's Leading Cases 446, that an accord is not
satisfaction, though founded upon a sufficient consideration ; but
the authorities cited, so far from supporting, actually contradict
the assertion. If Mr. Justice WOODWARD'S interpretation of the
maxim be received, and an accord, though founded on a new con-
sideration, must be executed before it can be pleaded in satisfac.
tion, then nothing but actual payment will discharge a debt.
In the State of Maine the principle of the maxim of accord and
satisfaction, which is the equality of consideration in all substituted
contracts, has been abolished by statute. R. S. of 1857, c. 82,
§ 44, which is in the following terms: " No action shall be main.
tained on a demand settled by a creditor, or his attorney in-
trusted to collect it, in full discharge of it by the receipt of money
or other valuable consideration, however small."
